Victim-centered justice? (part 2 of 2)

[Go here for the first part of this extended post…]

Gittos claims that, as it turned out, this new approach helped pave the way…

for a justice system which has spent 16 years completely reorientating itself away from objectivity and dispassionate assessment of evidence and towards elevating the rights of the victim at the expense of due process.

It’’s a good point. Nowadays a complainant can give evidence from behind a screen or by video link. His or her witness statement will have been taped, and it will often form the bulk of that person’s evidence at any trial. Meanwhile, the defendant sits in a dock, most often behind a thick glass screen, wearing headphones so that s/he can hear. S/he is semi-detached from what’’s going on in court.

The complainant will often be asked whether s/he needs a rest break, and will often be allowed to sit to give evidence. None of this solicitousness is likely be afforded to the defendant [1]. It could easily look (although this is surely not the intention) as if the whole process is ‘on the side’ of the complainant, and by implication ‘against’ the defendant.

In any event, as Gittos points out, the screen/ video link provision:

…removed an ancient legal principle – that a defendant should stand face to face with their accusers – in order to make the experience of engaging in the process easier for victims.

And then there was a further development, one which again appeared at the time to be beneficial.

[I]n 2007, Harriet Harman introduced the Victim Impact Statement. This allowed for victims to read prepared statements to the court, detailing how a crime had affected them emotionally, prior to the judge making a decision on sentence. Judges were quite open in stating that such statements could materially affect the sentence passed.

Gittos is arguably right to say:

[T]he sentencing process, which had been traditionally undertaken in the name of preventing further harm to society at large, became about repaying, through a deprivation of the defendant’’s liberty, the emotional harm done to the victim.

On the face of it, there is much that was positive about these initiatives. Who wouldn’’t want to make a demanding and difficult process easier for complainants? And why not involve them more in sentencing outcome? But the point is this.

Add together the provisions designed to support complainants and facilitate the difficult process of making a complaint and giving evidence. That is: taped complaint interview(s); the screen or video link; judicially expressed concern for the complainant’’s comfort and wellbeing; and court orders conferring lifelong anonymity on complainants, while the defendant’’s identity and personal story is often explored in excruciating detail for all to hear [2]. Compounded together, with others, these provisions can have an effect on the dynamic of any trial.

They can and often do detract from balance and objectivity.

They tend to confer an aura of dignity and truth-telling on a complainant. (S/he may or may not be telling the truth, but that’’s not the point.)

They tend to elicit sympathy, whereas this process should be about fact, not emotionality. It’’s a real trial, with real outcomes, not Boston Legal.

Taken together, they can easily communicate a sort of diffuse impression on a jury that the defendant is more likely to be guilty. S/he may be, of course, although, equally, she may not. But that determination, as to guilt or innocence, must only be about the quality of hard evidence, not about sympathy or about how courts and trials are set up to run.

As, again, Gittos puts it:

These reforms represented a clear move away from a criminal-justice system that prioritised objectivity to one which prioritised the stories and feelings of the victim. The victim went from being the invisible ‘third party’ in disputes between the state and the citizen to being the central focus.

Criminal trials, and especially those for extremely serious offences, are meant to be about an analysis and a determination. Analysis of the evidence. Determination of the truth: innocent or guilty. Anything that gets in the way of these ends brings about unfairness and damage, not only to human lives but also to the system of justice. Arguably, a strongly victim-centered criminal justice system is, in the end, damaging to justice, to fairness, and to the rule of law.



  1. who (and it needs to be said really quite often) is adjudged at this stage in this prosecution process to be as innocent as the complainant.  ↩
  2. This theme will be the subject of later posts.  ↩


Victim-centered justice? (part 1 of 2)

Here’’s how the prosecution system worked in England and Wales until at least 1994. (This applied to sexual offence cases and also to other kinds of offence based on a complaint.)

After a complaint a police inquiry would be initiated. The complainant was an important part of that process, but the police and CPS would be agnostic, for the moment, about whether s/he was reliable or telling the truth. After all, there could be any number of reasons for a complaint, some of them positive, others less so; and recall of events exists on a sliding scale of accuracy [1]. Of course, the whole point of the police inquiry was to test whether the complaint had any basis in fact and was evidence of a crime committed.

The police would follow up any number of relevant leads, and not just those supporting a prosecution. The aim was, in part, to assess the veracity and reliability of the evidence as the inquiry developed.

At a suitable juncture, a file would be sent to the CPS, and an assessment would be made on various criteria. On the evidence gathered, was a conviction more likely than not? Was it in the public interest to proceed to trial? At this point, instructions could be given to the police to make further inquiries to gather more evidence or to finesse that which they had already collected.

The key point here is this. The police and the CPS would together be acting independently. They were not agents of the complainant. They did not represent him or her in any way. Any trial would, importantly, be R [2] v John or Jane Doe, not Complainant A v John or Jane Doe. The complainant was a witness: a vital one, but nothing more. His or her evidence was to be evaluated like the evidence of any witness, for veracity and reliability.

Yes, this system could come over as a little aloof. Mostly because care would have been taken to treat the complainant as a witness and his or her evidence as just that: evidence, like any other. The task of police and CPS was to keep at arm’s length from the complainant and not to get sucked in to any agenda being worked out by him or her.

And then it all changed……

Luke Gittos sets out usefully what then happened.

In 1999, the New Labour government decided that [the] focus on objectivity and impartial judgement failed to do justice to the victims of crime. Jack Straw… said [3]: ‘”For too long, victims of crime have not been given a proper support and protection they deserve. This must change. I am determined to ensure that their needs are placed at the very heart of the criminal-justice system” [4].’….. The Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 allowed evidence from vulnerable witnesses to be given behind a screen or via a video link…. The Criminal Justice Act 2003 then extended these protection to all witnesses, whether considered vulnerable or not, as long as certain statutory criteria were met……

The intentions were no doubt commendable. There is every reason why complainants should be treated kindly and respectfully and their allegations should be taken seriously. The exercise of sensitivity towards a complainant is right and proper in itself. Apart from anything else, such care also helps ensure that complainants feel able to come forward in the first place.

But this should never be – and should never have been – at the expense of objectivity and impartiality……

[continued in the next post]



  1. As a hedge against this, the personal consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions used to be required for a wide range of sexual offence prosecutions. (Consent is still needed in a much narrower range of abuse cases.) Until 1994, corroboration (namely, some form of independent evidence confirming an element of the complainant’’s testimony) was also required by common law in certain cases.  ↩
  2. ‘‘R’’ = ‘’Regina’’, ‘”the Crown’’.  ↩
  3. ‘Partners Against Crime’, Victim Support Magazine, Summer 71, p 8.
  4. There is an obvious problem with what Straw said here. He appears to assume that the complainant is axiomatically believable and reliable as a witness. But this is the very thing that any well-founded trial system is meant to determine – on the basis or evidence and nothing else. Should a complainant’s “needs” be placed “at the very heart of the criminal-justice system”? Not at the expense of a fair determination of guilt or innocence.  ↩


Aims and Principles

The aim of Salem Redux is to explore the criminal law landscape, prosecution policy, and advocacy practice relating to the investigation, prosecution and trial of alleged sex offences in England and Wales.

Sex offence allegations are currently a vastly conflicted area of public culture in the UK. It is hard to think of an area of civic concern more open to knee-jerk reaction, scapegoating and name-calling.

Driven in part by an increasing obsession with sex abuse issues, huge changes have for some years been taking place in the criminal justice system of England and Wales. Those changes have damaged the rule of law and have taken place without adequate public awareness of their deeper consequences. Juries now regularly struggle, in sex offence trials, to find the wood for the trees, and are often left confused and bemused by the task before them.

Strong feelings are naturally unavoidable when it comes to alleged acts against children and young people. Everyone wants to preserve our young people from harm. But to allow emotionality to drive swings in policy, without comprehensive open debate, will build problems for society and individuals which may take decades to rectify – if indeed rectification ever takes place.

There is therefore a pressing need to conduct a proper public debate on the following topics:-

  • we need to discuss the corrosive effect on defendants’’ rights of the last twenty years of government policy decisions regarding admissibility of evidence generally in criminal cases, but particularly in connection with the prosecution of alleged sex offences.
  • we must identify and analyse the ideologies at work behind these policy decisions – both within the present government and the preceding one.
  • we must speak honestly about the yo-yo mood swings in public and media about sex offences in response to high-profile acquittals (Michael Le Vell, Nigel Evans) and then convictions (Stuart Hall, Max Clifford, Rolf Harris). We must honestly address the issues which lie behind that pendulum effect, and the ways in which governments have responded to those mood swings.
  • importantly, we must spot – and then critique – the prioritization (and almost canonization) of the ‘‘victim’’ complainant [1] within the criminal law – because this ‘’victim’’ mentality is leading to a gradual erosion of defendants’’ rights and a growing adoption of ‘’conviction success’’ ideology in the Crown Prosecution Service and police.

This is not in any way an anecdotal, existential or experiential blog. This blog tries to promote objective debate. Alongside that, it argues for an appreciation of the continuing value of centuries-old principles of criminal law in England and Wales, principles designed to balance justice with fairness.

Historically, English law has always argued that it is better, if it comes to it, to acquit a guilty person rather than convict an innocent one. That wise principle is now under attack as never before, and we must stop it from being further damaged.

The by-line to the blog, “”Judicial Barbarism?””, is taken from a Guardian ‘Comment is Free’ article by Simon Jenkins dated July 8, 2014, in which he writes:-

The case for finding new ways of detecting and treating [child abusers] is overwhelming, as is the case for helping their victims. That is where the state’s money should go. Yet we deal with sex crimes by licensing anonymous accusers and staging celebrity show trials, with lawyers in gladiatorial legal combat before juries. From the attendant publicity, no reputation survives. It is judicial barbarism.



  1. We put ‘’victim’’ in quotation marks because the matter is not as simple as it seems. Many complainants are no doubt telling the truth as they see it. Some are not. It is also arguable that, where a defendant is wrongly accused of a sex offence and is innocent, s/he is also a ‘victim’, if we are going to adopt that terminology. To speak of the ‘victim’’ so readily can mask the real issues, which are about justice and fairness – for all.  ↩